This article was prompted by the 2019 television drama series ‘Chernobyl’, and focuses on human error, safety culture and designing for safety. It provides some discussion points to engage with your key stakeholders and to facilitate safety moments.
I was heavily influenced by a HSE publication ‘Organising for Safety’, led by Dr Donald Broadbent. This post provides a key conclusion from this report and considers its relevance over 20 years later.
Nimrod XV230 was due to a catalogue of organisational failures and the lessons are relevant to any high-hazard or complex organisation.
In this article I provide ten questions to help stimulate discussion and reflection on leadership, culture and priorities.
Organisational change is inevitable, but does it have to lead to disaster? Whatever it is that defines ‘safety’ for your organisation, whether that is keeping chemicals in the pipes, keeping trains on the tracks, airplanes in the sky, or not harming patients; it is essential that any significant organisational changes are assessed for their impact on safety. This will include assessing changes to: roles and responsibilities, organisational structures, reporting relationships, staffing levels, staff location, outsourcing, use of contractors, delayering, downsizing and centralisation of functions. This article discusses two aspects of any change that need to be assessed and managed.
“Normalisation of deviance” is when deviations from agreed standards or working practices become incorporated into the routine. Small changes, slight deviations from the norm, gradually become the norm.
Here’s some guidance on identifying and managing such deviations before they become the new ‘normal’.
The first of several articles related to organisational failures highlighted in The Nimrod Review